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THE UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT: AN
EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
OF DEFINING DEATH
The occurrence of death traditionally has carried important legal,
medical, philosophical, and social implications.' Until recently, most legal
and medical persons perceived no problem with defining the
phenomenon of death.2 Both the legal and the medical professions tradi-
tionally regarded death as an event that occurred upon the cessation of
all vital functions, including circulation, heartbeat, and respiration.' The
common law emphasis on cardiorespiratory function was adequate when
the observer required visible and detectable evidence to determine the
occurrence of death4 and continues to be a reliable basis for pronouncing
death in most situations.' Recent advances in medical technology have
' See generally Veith, Fein, Tendler, Veatch, Kleiman & Kalkines, Brain Death: I. A
Status Report of Medical and Ethical Considerations, 238 J.A.M.A. 1651 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Brain Death 1]; Veith, Fein, Tendler, Veatch, Kleiman & Kalkines, Brain Death: II.
A Status Report of Legal Considerations, 238 J.A.M.A. 1744 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Brain Death II].
' See Guthrie, Brain Death and Criminal Liability, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 40, 42 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Guthrie] (no precise legal definition needed in past because death
regarded as absence of signs of life).
3 See Selby & Selby, Status of the Legal Definition of Death, 5 NEUROSURGERY 535,
535 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Selby & Selby]. Prior to 1979, Black's Law Dictionary defined
death as "[t]he cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stop-
page of the circulation of the blood and a cessation of the animal and vital functions conse-
quent thereupon, such as respiration, circulation, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed.
1968). But see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed. 1979) (recognizing that some states
have enacted brain death statutes); note 46 infra (state statutes containing brain death
standard). Cases applying the common law standard of death generally apply the definition
provided in Black's. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, _____, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279
(1958) (simultaneous death case); In re Estate of Schmidt, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968) (action
to determine survivorship); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, __ , 215 P.2d 478,
482 (1950) (simultaneous death issue); Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. 1952) (issue
of survivorship); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) (issue involving distribution of insurance proceeds). See generally Brain Death II,
supra note 1, at 1745.
' See Task Force on Death & Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics & Life Sciences,
Refinements in Criteria for the Determination of Death: An Appraisal, 221 J.A.M.A. 48,48
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Refinements] (necessity of visible manifestations of death before
development of instruments that assisted in detecting vital signs). Before the development
of cardiac and respiratory support devices absence of heartbeat and respiration accurately
established death in most cases. See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 46. Because of the in-
terdependence of the brain, heart, and lungs, cessation of circulation or respiration meant
that the brain necessarily would die within 30 minutes. Id.
" See Gregory, A New "Definition" of Death?, 9 LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRAC. No. 8 at
2 (Aug. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Gregory] (continued applicability of traditional criteria);
Refinements, supra note 4, at 48 (cessation of respiration and heartbeat indicate death in
most cases).
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complicated the determination of death in some cases, however.' The
development of artificial support devices, such as the respirator, has
enabled physicians to maintain cardiorespiratory functions in persons
whom physicians otherwise would pronounce dead under the common
law standard.' Since artificial support systems can prolong car-
diorespiratory functions in many patients who have, no possibility of
ever recovering brain function or spontaneous cardiorespiratory activity,
the medical profession has reevaluated the criteria and definition of
death.'
In reconsidering the definition of death, the medicai profession has
determined that death is a process rather than an event.' Recent medical
achievements in artificially prolonging life have led physicians to con-
clude that patients reach a stage ii the process of dying beyond which no
chance for recovery exists.'" The medical profession widely accepts that
cessation of total brain function, known as brain death, constitutes an ir-
reversible stage in the process of dying beyond which all other organs
imminently will cease to function." In addition, the medical profession
' See Gregory, supra note 5, at 2 (use of artificial support devices may preclude use of
traditional death standards); Refinements, supra note 4, at 48 (technological intervention
renders insufficient application of traditional standards for determining death); text accom-
panying notes 7 & 8 infra (development of artificial devices that may maintain car-
diorespiratory functions).
' See Capron and Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining
Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 89 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Capron & Kass] (insufficiency of traditional death standard where pacemakers and
respirators can maintain cardiorespiratory functions that no longer operate spontaneously).
8 See id. Criteria for determining death proposed by Harvard Medical School's Ad
Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death have received the widest accep-
tance by the medical profession regarding the determination of death. See id.; Ad Hoc Com-
mittee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Defini-
tion of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337, 337-38 (1968) [hereiniafter cited as Harvard
Committee]. The Harvard report adopted "irreversible coma" as the standard for death and
established specific criteria for diagnosing irreversible coma. Harvard Committee, supra, at
337-38; see text accompanying notes 9-12 infra (medical view of determination of death).
' See Hirsh, Brain Death, 1975 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 377, 378-79 [hereinafter cited as
Hirsh]. The medical profession has concluded that humans die in stages, progressing from
clinical death to brain death, to biological death, to cellular death. Id. at 378. Cessation of
respiration and circulation results in clinical death. Id. Absent prompt resuscitative
measures, brain death quickly follows clinical death since lack of oxygen to the brain causes
brain death in a matter of minutes. Id. In addition, brain death may eventually occur despite
resuscitation efforts. Id. at 379. Since the brain also dies in progressive stages, biological
death occurs only when all portions of the brain are dead. Id. The process of cellular death
follows biological death. Id. See generally Victor, Brain Death: An Overview, 1981 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 37 [hereinafter cited as Victor].
1" See Hirsh, supra note 9, at 379 (point of irreversibility in sequence of dying that
physicians can diagnose as death).
" See id.; Victor, supra note 9, at 41. The condition of brain death occurs when brain
tissue is destroyed completely. See id. The brain dies in progressive stages, beginning with
the higher centers of the brain, which control consciousness and related functions. See
Hirsch, supra note 9, at 379. Since the brain stem, which contains the vital centers control-
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has established various criteria for determining when the entire brain
has ceased to function.1
2
Although the medical profession has recognized the validity of the
brain death concept and the existence of reliable criteria to determine
when brain death has occurred, the legal profession has responded more
slowly to changes in medical technology. 3 Neither the courts nor the
state legislatures presently agree on application of the brain death stan-
dard as a legal basis for determining when death occurs. Examination
of the various legal issues that turn on the occurrence of death indicates
the need for a determination of death standard that is medically and
legally uniform.1'
The expanding practice of organ transplantation, for example, has
emphasized the need for a uniform standard of death that embraces the
brain death concept. 6 In 1968, the National Conference of Commis-
ling cardiovascular functions, dies last, spontaneous cardiorespiratory functions can con-
tinue despite irreversible destruction of higher centers of the brain. See id.; text accompa-
nying note 101 infra (brain damaged person who retains brain stem function may continue
spontaneous cardiorespiratory activity). Therefore, the medical profession accepts that only
total destruction of the brain, including the brain stem, signals the point of irreversibility in
the dying process. See Hirsh, supra note 9, at 379.
. " See Harvard Committee, supra note 8, at 337-38. The Harvard report established
three diagnostic criteria for determining irreversible cessation of brain function, which the
Committee labelled "irreversible coma." Id. The diagnostic criteria include complete
unresponsiveness and unreceptivity to externally applied stimuli, total absence of spon-
taneous breathing and spontaneous movements for a specified period of time, and the
absence of elicitable reflexes. Id. In addition, the Harvard Committee considered a flat elec-
troencephalogram to be valuable confirmation of the other tests. Id. at 338. The Harvard
Committee recommended that physicians repeat the tests 24 hours after the initial testing
and that doctors rule out the possibility that hypothermia or drugs induced the patient's
coma. Id.
Although the majority of physicians apply the Harvard criteria, other medical
organizations have established similar criteria for determination of irreversible cessation of
brain function. See generally Black, Brain Death (pts. 1 & 2), 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 338, 393
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Black] (discussion of various medical criteria for determining
death).
" See Note, The Time of Death-A Lega4 Ethical and Medical Dilemma, 18 CATH.
LAW. 243, 244 1972) [hereinafter cited as Time of Death] (difference of opinion between
legal and medical professions regarding definition of death).
" See text accompanying notes 46-49, 57-82 infra (various state approaches to deter-
mination of death).
" See Note, Legislation and Death: Do They Mix?, 46 ALB. L. REV. 174, 177-80 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Legislation and Death] (issues that require legal determination of
death standard); text accompanying notes 16-44 infra (discussing issues that require uniform
standard for determining death). Some commentators have suggested a contextual approach
to the determination of death that allows physicians to apply a different standard of death
in different situations. See generally Brennan & Delgado, Death: Multiple Definitions or a
Single Standard?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1323 (1981); Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J.
623 (1973). The application of different standards for different purposes, however, poses the
risk of confusion and abuse. See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 106-7 (criticizing possibility
of adopting multiple definitions of death for separate purposes).
" See, e.g., Dornette, How Does Your State Define Death?, 8 LEGAL ASPECTS MED.
PRAC. No. 5 at 19, 20-21 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dornette] (enactment of Uniform
1982] 1513
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sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act" (UAGA) in an effort to encourage donation of
anatomical gifts for transplantation and research.'8 The UAGA, adopted
in all states, 9 fails to specify the appropriate standards for determining
the death of prospective organ donors.20 Consequently, the effectiveness
of the UAGA has varied from state to state.2' The most successful organ
transplants generally involve donors who suffered brain death after a
sudden head injury, brain tumor, or stroke, since the organs of brain
dead donors generally neither have been destroyed nor have begun to
deteriorate and thus are more viable for transplantation.' In a state that
permits application of a brain death standard, physicians can prevent
deterioration of vital organs by artificially maintaining the circulation
and respiration of a patient who satisfies the ordinary medical criteria
for brain death.23 Thus, physicians may maintain the organs of a donor
Anatomical Gift Act necessitated definition of death that includes brain death standard);
Brain Death II, supra note 1, at 1744 (organ transplants require recognition of brain-related
criteria of death); F. Stuart, F. Veith, R. Cranford, Brain Death Laws and Patterns of Con-
sent to Remove Organs from Cadavers in the United States and Twenty-eight Other Coun-
tries, at 14-18 (May 30, 1980) (report presented at Sixth Annual Meeting of American Society
of Transplant Surgeons) [hereinafter cited as Stuart, Veith & Cranford] (brain death stand-
ard required to ensure viable organs for transplantation).
'7 UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (UAGA).
"See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (UAGA will
encourage anatomical gifts by establishing uniform and comprehensive procedures).
" See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7158 (West 1970); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-39-31 to -51 (1972); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4300-4307 (McKinney 1977); VA. CODE §§
32-364.3 to .11 (1950); Stuart, Veith & Cranford, supra note 16, at 4 (UAGA adopted in all 50
states by 1970).
o See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 7(b). The UAGA specifies the physician who
tends the prospective donor at his death determines the time of the donor's death, but the
Act fails to indicate what standards a physician must apply in declaring a person dead. Id.
The comments to § 7 of the UAGA note, however, that the determination of time of death is
left to the judgment of the attending physician. Commissioners' Notes, UNIFORM
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 7(b). The drafters of the UAGA apparently intended that time of
death would be a factual question that physicians would determine according to accepted
medical criteria. See id.; Note, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act-Death construed by Court
Consonant with Medical Standard of Brain Death-New York City Health & Hospitals
Corp. v. Sulsona, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 485, 591 (1976).
See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 177-78 (confusion over determination of
death under UAGA); text accompanying notes 22-28 infra (effect of different death stand-
ards on organ transplants).
' See New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1005-06, 367
N.Y.S.2d 686, 689-90 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (expert testimony that kidneys from donors pronounced
dead under common law standard have significantly greater incidence of post-operative
failure than kidneys from donors declared brain dead); Comment, The Criteria for Deter-
mining Death in Vital Organ Transplants-A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220,
224 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Vital Organ Transplants] (physicians can maintain circula-
tion of brain dead donor and increase probability of successful transplant); Stuart, Veith &
Cranford, supra note 16, at 1-3 (organs of brain dead donors generally have not sustained
destruction or deterioration).
" See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 178 (physician applying brain death
standard can maintain vital functions artificially to preserve organs for transplant).
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who is legally brain dead in a condition beneficial for transplantation
purposes. 4
In a jurisdiction that relies solely on the common law standard, a
physician seeking to remove a donor organ must await irreversible
cessation of the patient's heartbeat and respiration before pronouncing
death.' Consequently, under the traditional standard organs may
deteriorate beyond the point of viability by the time a doctor pronounces
the patient dead, thus significantly decreasing the probability of a suc-
cessful transplant." Although at least one court has held that doctors in
a state that follows the common law approach can apply a brain death
standard to determine the time of death for a prospective organ donor,"
many physicians hesitate to declare a potential donor brain dead out of
fear of criminal or civil liability.2 The absence of a uniform determina-
U Id.; see Brain Death II, supra note 1, at 1744 (artificial maintenance of donor's cir-
culation allows physicians to remove organs with minimal damage to organs); Stuart, Veith
& Cranford, supra note 16, at 2 (continued ventilatory support permits retrieval of vital
organs for transplant before organ deterioration).
I See Legislation & Death, supra note 15, at 177-78 (physician who must rely on com-
mon law definition may not remove organs until heart and lungs cease to function); Vital
Organ Transplants, supra note 22, at 224 (transplant surgeon in common law jurisdiction
must await cessation of heartbeat and respiration before removal of organ from donor).
, See Vital Organ Transplants, supra note 22, at 224 (since common law standard re-
quires cessation of circulation, vital organs will begin to deteriorate before removal from
donor's body); Stuart, Veith & Cranford, supra note 16, at 1-2 (greater deterioration in
organs removed from donor after cessation of cardiorespiratory functions).
" See New York City Health and Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1007, 367
N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1975). In Sulsona, the court noted the absence of a determination
of death statute in New York. Id. at 1003, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 687-88. The Sulsona court em-
phasized the discrepancy between the medically accepted concept of brain death and the
common law cardiorespiratory standard. Id., 367 N.Y.S.2d at 687-88. Reasoning that the
New York legislature intended the state's version of the UAGA to encourage anatomical
gifts, the Sulsona court concluded that the legislature implicitly authorized application of
the accepted medical standard of death. Id. at 1007, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 691. The Sulsona court
limited application of the brain death standard to organ transplantation but urged the New
York legislature to enact a statutory determination of death standard. Id., 367 N.Y.S.2d at
691.
2 See Brain Death II, supra note 1, at 1744 (potential liability of physician in common
law state); Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 178 & n.18 (physicians hesitant to per-
form transplants absent uniform statute authorizing brain death standard). Physicians in
common law jurisdictions appear reluctant to pronounce prospective organ donors brain
dead despite the provision in the UAGA that exempts from civil or criminal liability a per-
son who acts in good faith pursuant to the UAGA. See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §
7(c); Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 178. A physician who makes a good faith deter-
mination of death pursuant to § 7(b) of the UAGA arguably is exempt from liability under §
7(c). See id.
An unpublished Virginia case may have contributed to the reluctance of many physi-
cians to act in the absence of a brain death statute. See Tucker's Administrator v. Lower,
No. 2831 (Ct. Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972), noted in Compton, Telling the Time
of Human Death by Statute: An Essential and Progressive Trend, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
521, 523-28 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Compton]. In Tucker, the brother of a transplant
donor instituted a wrongful death action against several heart transplant surgeons who
removed donor's heart and kidney after a neurologist had declared donor brain dead. See
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tion of death standard that includes the brain death concept thus creates
confusion in transplantation situations and limits the effectiveness of the
UAGA.
In addition to affecting performance of organ transplants, the stand-
ard for determining the occurrence of death also is crucial in determin-
ing criminal and civil liability for the death of a person.19 In states that
do not apply a brain death standard, apprehension of a wrongful death
action or malpractice suit deters many physicians from pronouncing the
death of a patient with irreversible cessation of brain function,
regardless of whether the patient is a prospective organ donor."
Although no court has held a physician criminally liable for applying a
brain death standard, a physician in a common law jurisdiction who ter-
minates artificial means of support or removes a vital organ from a pa-
tient with continuing cardiorespiratory functions theoretically has com-
mitted homicide.31 Thus, the absence of a legally accepted brain death
standard as a basis for determing death presents physicians with the
dilemma of artificially prolonging the cardiorespiratory functions of a
patient who is dead under medical standards or risking criminal or civil
liability for complying with the standards that the medical profession ac-
cepts.
In addition to a physician's potential personal liability, the actions of
a physician in the absence of a brain death standard may enable the per-
Compton, supra, at 524-5. Although Virginia had no determination of death statute at the
time of the Tucker action, the Virginia legislature had enacted the UAGA. See VA. CODE §§
32-364.3 to .11 (1950) (enacted 1970). The trial judge declined to authorize a brain death
standard as a matter of law, but instructed the jury to consider the evidence in light of the
possible criteria of death, including brain death. See Compton, supra, at 527-28 n.28.
Although the jury returned a verdict in favor of the surgeons, presumably guided by the
brain death instruction, other physicians may hesitate to declare a prospective organ donor
dead under the UAGA alone. See Legislation and Death, supra note 15 (many physicians
hesitate to perform transplant surgery in confusion over determination of death under
UAGA).
See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 177; text accompanying notes 30-34 in-
fra.
30 See Capron and Kass, supra note 7, at 97-98 (medical profession's concern with
potential civil or criminal liability in the absence of statutory provision); Victor, supra note
9, at 51 (physicians may fear criminal or civil liability for actions taken in absence of
statutory standards). Cf. Tucker's Administrator v. Lower, No. 2831 (Ct. Law & Eq., Rich-
mond, Va., May 25, 1972) noted in Compton, supra note 28 (jury verdict in favor of defendant
surgeons in wrongful death action); note 28 supra (discussing Tucker).
"' See Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 450, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 533 (1980) (dictum)
(physician who removes life sustaining devices absent authorization arguably commits
homicide), modified, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); Guthrie, supra
note 2, at 58 (although no physician yet held criminally liable for applying brain death stand-
ard, action in absence of legal standard theoretically homicide); Vital Organ Transplants,
supra note 22, at 231 (statement of Deputy District Attorney of Los Angeles that under
common law standard, removal of vital organ from donor who has not suffered cessation of
heartbeat, respiration and brain function theoretically is murder).
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son who initially injured the patient to escape liability.2 Defendants in
homicide or wrongful death actions may argue that termination of arti-
ficial support devices which maintained the victim's cardiorespiratory
functions caused the victim's death or broke the causal chain between
defendant's action and the victim's death." Since a person's liability for
his or her wrongful actions' should not rest upon the definition of death
applied in the jurisdiction in which the act occurred, 4 the acceptance of a
determination of death standard uniform among the states is essential.
The absence of a uniform standard for determining death also may
affect resolution of property right disputes." The occurrence of death
controls when the heirs or legatees of a decedent are entitled to receive
their shares of the decedent's estate. In addition, time of death deter-
See generally Guthrie, supra note 2, at 50-57. Although no defendant successfully
has asserted that the intervening acts of a physician caused the victim's death, arguably a
physician risks civil or criminal liability for terminating artificial support devices. See id. at
51; cf. Parker v. United States, 406 A.2d 1275, 1279-80 (D.C. 1979) (defendant entitled to in-
struction that physician's actions were intervening cause of victim's death only if evidence
introduced of intentional or willful malpractice or abnormal response).
3 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, -, 603 P.2d 74, 76 (1979) (defendant
appealed first degree murder conviction, arguing that physician's termination of artificial
support caused victim's death and thus insufficient evidence of defendant's guilt existed);
People v. Saldana, 47 Cal. App. 3rd 954, 958, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243, 245 (1975) (defendant
challenged second degree murder conviction on ground that removal of respirator was the
unforeseeable intervening cause of death); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, ,
366 N.E.2d 744, 748 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978). In Golston, for example, the
trial court instructed the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of brain death satisfied
the essential element of death in a homicide charge. Id. at __, 366 N.E.2d at 747. Since
Massachusetts had no brain death statute, defendant relied on the common law definition of
death to challenge his first degree murder conviction. Id. at __, 366 N.E.2d at 748.
Defendant argued that if the doctors had not disconnected the respirator, the victim might
have continued to exhibit cardiorespiratory functions more than a year and a day after
defendant's attack, thus exempting defendant from criminal liability under the common law
rule in Massachusetts. Id. at__, 366 N.E.2d at 748; see Commonwealth v. Vanetzian, 350
Mass. 491, -, 215 N.E.2d 658, 660 n.1 (common law rule in Massachusetts that to con-
stitute criminal homicide, victim must die within a year and a day of infliction of mortal
wound). The Golston court rejected defendant's arguments, adopting the standard of the
Uniform Brain Death Act. 373 Mass. at __ , 366 N.E.2d at 749; see UNIFORM BRAIN
DEATH ACT (person who sustains irreversible cessation of total brain function, including
brain stem, is dead) (superseded 1980 by UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT). See
generally Guthrie, supra note 2, at 50-54.
1 A person's liability for his or her wrongful actions depends on the substantive law of
the state where the act occurred. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 823-25 (1975) (law of
state where activity occurred determines whether conduct wrongful); Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (only courts of state where criminal act occurred may try violations
of state's criminal law). Since all states proscribe the wrongful killing of a person, however,
a person's culpability for his or her act should not depend upon whether or not the forum
state applies the brain death standard or the cardiorespiratory standard.
See text accompanying notes 36-41 infra.
See, e.g., Spotts v. Spotts, 331 Mo. 917, -, 55 S.W. 2d 977, 984 (1932) (no one en-
titled to inherit from person until death of that person); Ware v. Beach, 322 P.2d 635, 639
1982] 1517
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mines which persons will inherit from the decedent." The exact time of
death is crucial particularly when the devolution of property depends
upon the order of death and the determination of survivorship.3 8 Since
courts that address survivorship issues typically accept the slightest
evidence indicating survival, the definition of death applied in the par-
ticular jurisdiction is crucial. 9 Under the common law cardiorespiratory
standard of death, a person theoretically survives another if his or her
heart beats once more than that of the other decedent." Thus, in a com-
mon law state a brain dead person whose cardiorespiratory functions are
maintained artificially arguably survives a fellow victim of the common
disaster whose cardiorespiratory functions are not maintained. In a
state that applies a brain death standard, however, courts presumably
will regard time of death for survivorship purposes as the time when
brain death occurred. Consequently, a uniform system for determining
death would clarify survivorship and other inheritance problems and
avoid inconsistent outcomes resulting from different standards.
In addition to simplifying inheritance problems, a uniform deter-
mination of death standard would aid resolution of insurance claims. '
Many insurance policies contain provisions that entitle the beneficiary to
(Okla.) (property descends upon death and rests in legatees and heirs), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
819 (1958).
" See, e.g., In re Murphy's Estate, 157 Cal. 63, ., 106 P. 230, 232 (1910) (where
devise made to class, class members who survive testator take devise); Harris Trust & Sav-
ings Bank v. Jackson, 412 Ill. 261, -, 106 N.E. 2d 188, 192 (1952) (heirs of person deter-
mined as of time of death of that person).
' See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, _,317 S.W. 2d 275, 276 (1968) (construc-
tion of wills of husband and wife killed in common accident); In re Estate of Schmidt, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 847, 848 (1968) (proceeding to determine heirship); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App.
2d 371, __ , 215 P.2d 478, 479 (1970) (action to quiet title where joint tenants died close in
time); Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 179 (devolution of property subject to joint
tenancy may depend on whether joint tenants died simultaneously). To resolve issues of sur-
vivorship in cases of common disasters, when order of death is difficult to determine, most
states have adopted the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
ACT; see, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 296-296.8 (West 1956); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 91-3-1 to -15
(1972); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.6 (1981); VA. CODE §§ 64.1-97 to -104 (1950).
The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act provides that if insufficient evidence exists to show
that persons did not die simultaneously, the property of each decedent passes as though he
or she survived the other decedent. UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 1; see text accom-
panying note 39 infra (courts typically accept slightest evidence of survival).
"' See, e.g., In re Estate of Rowley, 275 Cal. App. 2d 324, -, 65 Cal. Rptr. 139,
143-45 (1967) (court accepts expert testimony that one victim survived the other by
1/150,000 of a second); Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. 1952) (where husband and
wife struck and killed by train, evidence that blood spurted from decapitated wife's neck for
several moments established that wife survived husband); Hirsh, supra note 9, at 391
(courts applying common law standard accept slightest evidence of continued vital functions
to establish survivorship); Vital Organ Transplants, supra note 22, at 229 (same).
o See Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. 1952) (although person decapitated,
not dead as long as spurts of blood indicate heart pumping).
" See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
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the insurance proceeds only if the death of the insured occurs within a
specified period of time after the accident.42 The use of artificial support
devices may prolong the cardiorespiratory functions of a person who
otherwise would have died within the specified period. In a jurisdiction
that applies the common law standard, an insurance company legally can
withhold payment of the insurance proceeds if cardiorespiratory func-
tions artificially continue beyond the prescribed time limit.4" In a state
that permits application of a brain death standard, however, physicians
could pronounce the death of a patient who suffered irreversible cessa-
tion of brain function within the specified period.44 Thus, adoption of a
uniform determination of death standard that applies the brain death
concept when artificial support devices maintain a patient's car-
diorespiratory functions would eliminate the disparate treatment of in-
surance proceeds depending on the death standard applied in the par-
ticular jurisdiction.
Because of the widespread importance of a determination of death,
an effective standard requires application uniform throughout the
United States. Currently no consensus exists among the states concern-
ing the determination of death.4" Thirty-three states authorize at least
limited application of a brain death standard.46 Of the thirty-three states,
the legislatures of twenty-seven states have codified brain death stand-
ards, and the courts of the remaining six states have sanctioned use of
I See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 179 & n.23 (typical limit in accidental
death provisions).
" See id. at 178-79 (in state applying cardiorespiratory standard, insurance company
legally can withhold payment if insured is maintained on respirator beyond 90 day period);
Cf. Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W. 2d 788, 793-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
Douglas involved an action to recover accidental death benefits under an insurance policy.
Id. at 790. The insurance policy provided for double indemnity in the event of accidental
death if death occurred within 90 days of the accident. Id. Although physicians testified that
decedent would have died within 90 days without the use of artificial support devices, the
court refused to award the accidental death benefits because death actually occurred 120
days after the accident. Id. at 793. Although the record in Douglas fails to indicate whether
the deceased insured would have fulfilled the criteria of brain death, the case illustrates the
potential treatment of insurance proceeds in a state that regards death exclusively as cessa-
tion of cardiorespiratory functions. See id. at 790, 793-94.
" See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 180 (adoption of brain death standard
allows determination of death within 90 day period under insurance contracts).
' See text accompanying notes 46-49 infra.
See text accompanying notes 47-48 infra.
' See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 to -4 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1981);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp.
1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139(i)(b) (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.085
(Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1715.1 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (Supp. 1979);
IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 112, § 302(b) (Smith-Hurd 1978);
IOWA CODE § 702.8 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:111 (West. Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 43, § 54F (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.1021
(1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323
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brain death determinations." In states that neither legislatively nor
judicially have approved a brain death standard, the common law car-
diorespiratory standard presumably continues to apply." To achieve a
definition of death uniform throughout the United States, all states
should adopt determination of death standards consistent with stand-
ards that all other states apply.
To achieve uniform treatment by the states, a determination of
death standard applicable for all purposes requires statutory enactment
rather than judicial adoption. An effective determination of death stand-
ard must apply generally in all situations to provide legal certainty.
Since most courts define death only in the context of the action before
them," judicial resolution of determination of death issues may result in
varying definitions of death. Thus, judicial standards adopted in one
situation provide little or no guidance for a physician to determine death
in another context.2 In addition, judicial adoption of determination of
death standards fails to provide an immediate solution to determination
(1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-301(g) (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.087
(1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459 (1977); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 4447t (Vernon Supp.
1981); VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (Supp. 1981); WYO. STAT. §
35-19-101 (Supp. 1981).
See Arizona v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, __ , 603 P.2d 74, 77-78 (1979) (adoption of
Uniform Brain Death Act); Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 418, __, 601 P.2d 1072,
1081 (1979) (adoption of Uniform Brain Death Act); Swafford v. State, - Ind. ..
__ ., 421 N.E.2d 596, 602 (1981) (adoption of Uniform Determination of Death Act); Com-
monwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, __ , 366 N.E.2d 744, 748-49 (1977) (adoption of brain
death standard), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v.
Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1007, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (adoption of brain
death standard for transplantation purposes); In re Welfare of Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407,
421, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (1980) (adoption of Uniform Determination of Death Act); notes 84-87
infra (Uniform Determination of Death Act).
" See Dornette, supra note 16 (common law standard presumably applies in jurisdic-
tions without statutory definitions of death).
0 See New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1007, 367
N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (defining death only for purpose of UAGA); Legislation and
Death, supra note 15, at 183 (courts only bound to resolve particular question presented).
5, See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 174-75 (judicial definitions of death may
vary depending on facts of particular case).
5 See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 96; Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel, Towards a
Statutory Definition of Death in Illinois, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 701, 709 (1981) (judicial resolu-
tion of determination of death issue provides no guidance in other situations) [hereinafter
cited as Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel]. A physician's choice of action in a situation that a
court in the physician's jurisdiction has not addressed may rest more on the physician's will-
ingness to test his or her position in court than on actual merits of each course of action. See
Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 96 & n.33. For example, in New York, which applies a brain
death standard only in transplant situations, a physician arguably risks criminal or civil
liability if the doctor terminates artificial support of a brain dead person who is not an organ
donor. See New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1007, 367
N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (brain death standard for transplant purposes); text accompanying notes
30 & 31 supra (possible civil or criminal liability for physicians who apply brain death stand-
ards withobt statutory or judicial authorization).
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of death questions since courts generally await litigation to address
separate determination of death issues. 3 Moreover, courts that adopt a
new standard which applies for all purposes are subject to criticism for
exceeding the proper bounds of judicial action.-4 Finally, although the
doctrine of stare decisis arguably binds courts to follow judicially
adopted determination of death standards,55 physicians often are reluc-
tant to rely on judicially authorized standards." Consequently, legisla-
tion establishing determination of death standards provides a more con-
crete basis on which physicians may act than judicial decisions.
The present legislative approaches of states to the determination of
death fall within three general categories. Seven states follow the
"alternative" approach, which provides that death occurs when a patient
either suffers irreversible cessation of spontaneous cardiorespiratory
function or sustains irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain
function." The Kansas definition of death statute,9 for example,
preserves the common law standard but permits a physician applying
ordinary medical standards to declare a person dead based on total
cessation of brain function." The Kansas statute and other statutes that
apply the alternative approach fail to specify when a physician must
apply each standard."' Consequently, the alternative approach arguably
' See New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc.2d 1002, 1007, 367
N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (adopts brain death standard only in context of organ
transplants and urges legislature to enact state-wide remedy to determination of death
issue); Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 96 (case law approach to establishing death stan-
dards involves delay); Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 183 (courts slow in attempts
to define death).
I See Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel, supra note 52, at 709 (courts that actually have
adopted new definitions of death beyond specific context of case before them criticized for
exceeding proper scope of judicial action).
' See, e.g., Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 210 (1910) (courts generally follow prior
holding on same legal problem although doctrine flexible); Cenven, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 842, 843, 393 N.Y.S.2d 700, 700, 362 N.E.2d 251, 252 (1977) (court should not
depart from doctrine of stare decisis absent compelling circumstances).
-4 See Brain Death II, supra note 1, at 1744 (case law subject to appeal and subsequent
judicial action); Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 196-97 (judicial decisions fail to pro-
vide concrete basis on which physicians can rely).
', See text accompanying notes 58-84 infra (state legislative approaches to determina-
tion of death).
-M IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1981) (Uniform Determination of Death Act); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 43, § 54F (1980); MISS. CODE ANN. §
41-36-3 (1981) (Uniform Determination of Death Act); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); OR.
REV. STAT. § 146.001 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (Supp. 1980); Selby & Selby, supra
note 3, at 535-36 (discussing alternative definition approach).
'3 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1981).
'o Id. The Kansas statute provides that a person is dead when he or she either lacks
spontaneous cardiac and respiratory function or lacks spontaneous brain function. Id.
' See generally IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp.
1981); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 43, § 54F (1980); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.001 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (Supp. 1980).
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suggests the existence of two distinct phenomena of death that occur at
separate points in time.2 Moreover, if the brain death standard
specificially refers to transplantation of organs, the alternative type
statute may appear to authorize a separate, earlier time of death when
the patient is a potential organ donor." The requirement that physicians
base determinations of death on ordinary medical standards, however,
arguably restrains a physician's discretion in deciding which standard to
apply. 4 The alternative approach permits a physician to respond to dif-
ferent medical conditions by providing two procedures for determining
the occurrence of death. In addition, the alternative approach
preserves some medical flexibility by anticipating that advances in
medical technology may affect ordinary medical procedures for deter-
mining death.66
A second legislative approach to the determination of death, which
prevails in eight states,67 also provides alternative standards for deter-
mining death. The second approach, however, indicates under which
circumstances each standard applies. Statutes applying the second ap-
proach typically provide that death occurs upon irreversible cessation of
cardiorespiratory function unless artificial support systems maintain
respiration and heart beat, in which case death occurs upon irreversible
" See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 109 (alternative definitions create misconcep-
tion that two separate phenomena of death exist); Kennedy, The Kansas Statute on
Death-An Appraisal, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 946, 947-48 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ken-
nedy] (alternative standards suggest two types of death).
I See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 109-110 (alternative definitions apparently in-
tended to establish special definition of death for organ transplantations); Kennedy, supra
note 62, at 947-48 (purpose of alternative definitions is to facilitate transplant surgery);
Selby & Selby, supra note 3, at 535-36 (alternative definitions may permit physicians to pro-
nounce prospective organ donors dead at earlier point than non-donors).
" See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 186-87 (provision requiring application
of ordinary medical standards imposes limits on physician's discretion in determining
death).
See id. Pronouncing death based on cessation of heartbeat and respiration continues
to be a common and reliable means of determining death in most cases. See Brain Death II,
supra note 1, at 1748. In cases in which a physician can determine death based on the tradi-
tional criteria, requiring a physician to perform the more complex tests necessary to
establish brain death wastes time and resources. See Legislation and Death, supra note 15,
at 190.
See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 186-87 (alternative approach allows
medical profession to perform determinations of death according to medical advances).
, See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 382.085 (Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE §
702.8 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.102
(1980); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1981).
" See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 111. The second statutory approach to the
determination of death is based upon the model that Capron and Kass proposed. Id.; see,
e.g., Selby & Selby, supra note 3, at 536 (Capron-Kass model); Brain Death II, supra note 1,
at 1747 (second approach suggested by Capron and Kass).
"9 See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 111 (brain death standard applies only when
artificial support devices preclude application of cardiorespiratory standard); text accompa-
nying note 70 infra.
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cessation of brain function. ° Although statutes following the second ap-
proach appear to limit the discretion of the physician by providing that
the brain death standard applies ofnly when artificial support
mechanisms preclude application of the cardiorespiratory standard, the
restriction arguably is redundant and misleading. 1' Since the medical
profession considers absence of spontaneous respiration a criterion for
brain death, 2 ordinary medical standards limit application of the brain
death standard to patients with artificially maintained cardiorespiratory
functions.1 3 Thus, the statutory limitation on when physicians may apply
each standard appears unnecessary.
The third determination of death approach, which twelve state
legislatures have adopted,"4 applies a brain death standard.75 Some states
exclusively apply a strict brain death standard, requiring irreversible
cessation of brain function to determine death.8 Other state statutes
provide that death occurs upon irreversible cessation of brain function
but note that the statutory standard does not preclude application of
other medically accepted standards."1 Defining death exclusively as
11 See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 382.085 (Supp. 1981); HAWAH REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (Supp. 1979); IowA CODE §
702.8 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. ComP. LAWS §-333.1021
(1980); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1981).
"1 See Lovato v. District Court: The Dilemma of Defining Death, 58 DEN. L.J. 627,
633-34 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Dilemma] (statutes providing that brain death standard
applies only in event cardiorespiratory functions artificially maintained are inaccurate and
redundant); text accompanying notes 72 & 73 infra (ordinary medical standards limit physi-
cian's discretion in applying brain death standard).
I See, e.g., Harvard Committee, supra note 8, at 337 (absence of spontaneous respira-
tion is criterion of irreversible coma); Collaborative Study, An Appraisal of the Criteria of
Cerebral Death. A Summary Statement, 237 J.A.M.A. 982, 982-84 (brain death criteria in-
clude absence of spontaneous respiration); Victor, supra note 9, at 49 (absence of spon-
taneous respiration common prerequisite for brain death in all medical proposals). See
generally Black, supra note 12.
" See Dilemma, supra note 71, at 634 (no need to enumerate statutorily requirement
of absence of spontaneous respiration since medical profession regards lack of spontaneous
respiration criterion of brain death).
"' See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82.537 (Supp. 1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180
(West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139i(b) (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. §
88-1715 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 302(b) (Smith-Hurd 1978) (only applies to
UAGA); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1979)
(Uniform Brain Death Act); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §
1-301(g) (West. Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (Supp.
1981) (Uniform Brain Death Act); Wyo. STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1981). See also note 48 supra
(states that judicially have adopted brain death standard).
See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 189-90 (brain death approach).
18 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 302(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007
(1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-301(g) (West Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459
(1977); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (Supp. 1981); WYO. STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1981).
1 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-139(i)(b) (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1715 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323
(1981). See also State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, , 603 P.2d 74, 77-79 (1979) (common law
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brain death, however, suggests that physicians must determine the
death of each patient under the brain death standard even though the
traditional standard conclusively establishes death in most patients. 8
Thus, a strict brain death standard may prevent a physician from vary-
ing procedures according to the particular circumstances.7 1 In addition,
strict brain death statutes lack flexibility in the event of advances in
medical technology." Brain death statutes that do not preclude use of
other medically accepted standards to determine death permit a physi-
cian to act according to the circumstances of each case and preserve flex-
ibility in the event of medical or technological advances.81 Although non-
preclusive brain death statutes arguably suggest that alternative defini-
tions of death exist,82 the statutes merely permit a physician to apply in
each situation the ordinary medical procedures for determining death.
Examination of the variety of statutorily and judicially adopted
state approaches emphasizes the desirability of uniform treatment of the
determination of death. 3 The Uniform Determination of Death Act84
(UDODA), drafted by the American Bar Association (ABA), the
American Medical Association (AMA), and the NCCUSL, represents an
attempt to establish a uniform determination of death standard for all
definition still sufficient to establish death despite adoption of brain death standard); Lovato
v. District Court, 198 Colo. 418, -, 601 P.2d 1072, 1081 (1979) (adoption of Uniform
Brain Death Act does not preclude continuing recognition of common law standard).
" See, e.g., Selby & Selby, supra note 3, at 537 (statute suggesting exclusive applica-
tion of brain death standard fails to recognize that common law standard adequate in most
cases); Dilemma, supra note 71, at 634 (strict brain death standard may create false impres-
sion that each death must be determined by brain death criteria); Legislation and Death,
supra note 15, at 190 (strict brain death standard fails to allow for any variance of procedure
depending on circumstances).
"' See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 190; note 65 supra (requirement that
physicians perform more complicated brain death procedures when traditional procedures
conclusively establish death is an unnecessary waste of time and resources). Many physi-
cians, particularly small town and rural practitioners, have neither the access to equipment
required to perform brain death procedures nor the opportunity to learn to operate the
equipment. See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 190. Since the common law stand-
ard is conclusive in most cases, requiring that physicians apply the brain death standard in
all cases appears inappropriate. Id.
8 See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 190-91.
81 See id. If a brain death statute authorizes a physician to determine death pursuant
to customary standards of medical practice, physicians probably will apply the traditional
standard when appropriate. See Selby & Selby, supra note 3, at 537.
82 See Dilemma, supra note 71, at 634 (nonpreclusive brain death statutes may suggest
alternative definitions of death); Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 190 (allowing use
of customary procedures in addition to brain death standard essentially the same as alter-
native approach); cf. text accompanying notes 58-66 supra (alternative approach).
' See text accompanying notes 58-82 supra (various state approaches).
" UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT (UDODA). Four states have adopted the
UDODA. See Swafford v. State, __ Ind. ., , 421 N.E.2d 596, 602 (1981); In re
Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 421, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (1980); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1981);




legal and medical purposes.85 Paralleling alternative type statutes in
structure and substance, the UDODA codifies the common law car-
diorespiratory basis of, determining death, which effectively diagnoses
most deaths.88 Similarly, the UDODA recognizes that irreversible cessa-
tion of total brain function provides a medically accepted basis for deter-
mining death when artificial maintenance of cardiorespiratory functions
precludes application of the common law standard." Although the ex-
istence of alternative standards arguably suggests that two separate
phenomena of death exist, the UDODA actually recognizes alternative
procedures for determining when the single phenomenon of death has
occurred.' In providing alternative procedures, however, the UDODA
does not confer. unlimited discretion on physicians. 9 Although the
statutory language of the UDODA does not specify that the brain death
standard applies only when artificial means of support preclude applica-
tion of the cardiorespiratory standard, the Act does require that a physi-
See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT
[hereinafter cited as Commissioners' Note]. The UDODA is a unique co-operative effort,
representing the consensus of the ABA, the AMA, and the NCCUSL. Id.; see McCabe, The
New Determination of Death Act, 67 A.B.A.J. 1476, 1476 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
Cabe]. In 1975, the ABA Law and Medicine Committee suggested a Model Definition of
Death Act, which presented a definition of death based on irreversible cessation of total
brain function. ABA MODEL DEFINITION OF DEATH ACT; see Selby & Selby, supra note 3, at
537. Influenced by the earlier ABA model, the NCCUSL adopted the Uniform Brain Death
Act (UBDA) in 1978. See UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH ACT (superseded 1980 by UNIFORM DETER-
MINATION OF DEATH ACT); McCabe, supra at 1476. The UBDA also established a death stan-
dard based on irreversible cessation of total brain function, but emphasized that the stan-
dard included cessation of brain stem function. UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH ACT § 1 (superseded
1980 by UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT). In 1979, the AMA approved a Model
Determination of Death statute that allowed a physician to base determinations of death on
accepted medical standards, including irreversible cessation of total brain function. AMA
MODEL DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT; see Selby & Selby, supra note 3, at 538. Recognizing
the necessity of a uniform standard for determining death, representatives of the ABA,
AMA, and NCCUSL attempted to find language common to the models. See McCabe, supra,
at 1476; Commissioners'Note, supra. The UDODA, which contains language common to the
various model statutes, thus represents the agreement of the legal and medical professions
on an appropriate determination of death standard. See McCabe, supra at 1476; Commis-
sioners' Note, supra.
" UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1(1); see Commissioners'Note, supra note
85 (UDODA codifies common law basis for determining death); cf. text accompanying note
58 supra (alternative approach).
' UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1(2; see Commissioners'Note, supra note
85 (alternative procedures provided for determining death when artificial means of support
prevent application of traditional standards); cf. text accompanying note 58 supra (alter-
native approach).
, See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; Commissioners' Note, supra note
85 (alternative procedures for determining when death has occurred); text accompanying
notes 61-64 supra (alternative approach suggests two types of death but actually establishes
two procedures for determining death).
" See text accompanying notes 64 & 65 supra (discretion of physicians limited by re-
quirement that physicians determine death pursuant to ordinary medical standards).
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cian determine death according to accepted standards of medical prac-
tice." The medical profession generally agrees that physicians may base
determinations of death upon irreversible cessation of brain function
only when artificial support devices maintain a patient's car-
diorespiratory functions. 1 Thus, the UDODA failure to specify when the
alternative procedures apply is immaterial, since accepted medical
standards indicate when the brain death standard applies.2
By providing that accepted medical standards regulate determina-
tions of death, the UDODA reconciles the need for cognizable legal and
medical standards with the need for adaptability to scientific changes. 3
The UDODA establishes a general legal standard for determining death
but recognizes that the medical profession must formulate the ap-
propriate criteria for determining when a patient satisfies the general
standard. 4 Since medical and technological advances will continue to im-
prove criteria for determining death, codifying specific criteria poses the
risk of perpetuating inflexible and outmoded tests when better techni-
ques arise." Thus, the UDODA satisfies the legal preference for certainty
by providing a general standard of when a person is medically and legally
dead. In addition, the UDODA avoids rigidity by anticipating medical
' See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; cf. text accompanying notes 68-70
supra (statutes based on Capron & Kass model specify when physicians may apply alter-
native standards).
91 See generally Black, supra note 12; Harvard Committee, supra note 8; Refinements,
supra note 4.
92 See Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 186-7 (ordinary medical standards limit
physician's discretion in determining which standard to apply); text accompanying note 64
supra (same).
" See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478
(UDODA intended to provide general standard and to permit extension of diagnostic techni-
ques resulting from medical achievements); Commissioners'Note, supra note 85 (purpose of
UDODA to extend common law to encompass new techniques for determining death); text
accompanying notes 64 & 65 supra (alternative standards permit physicians to respond to
different medical conditions and advances in medical technology); notes 94-97 infra (UDODA
establishes general legal standard but provides for changes in medical technology).
" See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478.
The UDODA establishes the general standard under which physicians may determine death
but does not incorporate specific medical criteria. See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH
ACT § 1; McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478. Although the drafters of the UDODA considered
the adequacy of specific medical criteria and tests before approving the general
physiological standards in the Act, the drafters recognized the inadvisability of legislating
specific medical criteria for determining when a patient meets the particular standard
because of the possibility of improved criteria. See McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478; Commis-
sioners' Note, supra note 85.
" See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 103, 108, 113 (need for flexibility in event of
medical advances argument against legislating specific criteria or tests); McCabe, supra
note 85, at 1478 (incorporating criteria into statutes poses risk that statute will require ap-
plication of outmoded criteria); Legislation and Death, supra note 15, at 190-91 (legislature
should avoid rigidity in statute by drafting statute to allow for advances in medical
technology).
1 See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1.
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development of improved techniques for diagnosing when patients fulfill
the medico-legal standard."
In establishing the general physiological standards for determining
death, the UDODA conforms with the prevailing medical view that brain
death involves irreversible cessation of total brain function.
8 Moreover,
the UDODA avoids potential problems underlying less specific brain
death standards by emphasizing that the entire brain, including the
brain stem, irreversibly must cease to function before a physician may
pronounce death under the brain death standard.9 Failure of brain death
standards specifically to include irreversible destruction of the brain
stem arguably suggests that a physician may pronounce the death of a
person who, because of continuing brain stem function, is in a "persis-
tent vegetative state."'10 A severely brain damaged patient who retains
brain stem function, however, may continue to exhibit spontaneous car-
diorespiratory activities. 0 ' Requiring irreversible -termination of brain
I See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478
(UDODA avoids incorporating specific criteria and permits limited extension of diagnostic
techniques resulting from medical advances).
"See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478
(nearly universal agreement that death occurs when brain irreversibly and totally ceases to
function); Commissioners' Note, supra note 85 ("neocortical death" and "persistent
vegetative state" not considered valid legal or medical bases for determining death); text ac-
companying notes 11-12 supra (medical profession accepts irreversible cessation of total
brain function as death). See generally, Black, supra note 12; Harvard Committee, supra
note 8, Refinements, supra note 4.
"See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478
(UDODA provides clear distinction between life and death by excluding persistent
vegetative state); text accompanying notes 100-106 infra (problems with failure to specify
absence of brain stem function). In addition to the four states that have adopted the
UDODA, supra note 84, two other states specifically include destruction of the brain stem in
their determination of death statutes. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1979); Wyo. STAT. §
35-19-101 (Supp. 1980); Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel, supra note 52, at 715 & n.62 (two
state statutes include death of brain stem).
M See McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478 (requirement of brain stem destruction in
UDODA avoids debate surrounding persistent vegetative state); Commissioners' Note,
supra note 85 (UDODA requires cessation of brain stem to distinguish determination of
death from persistent vegetative state).
"' See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In
Quinlan, the father of a comatose young woman sought appointment as guardian of his
daughter, Karen Ann, requesting that the letters of guardianship contain the express power
to authorize termination of extraordinary medical care. 70 N.J. at 18,355 A.2d at 651. Physi-
cians testified that Karen Ann was in a "chronic and persistent vegetative state" but that
Karen Ann was not brain dead under the Harvard criteria. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654; see
Harvard Committee, supra note 8, at 337-38 (criteria for determining irreversible cessation
of brain function); note 12 supra (Harvard criteria). According to the testifying physicians,
Karen Ann's existent brain stem function was ineffective for spontaneous respiration and
she could not survive without a respirator. 70 N.J. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655. Recognizing that a
patient's right to privacy permits discontinuance of extraordinary treatment in the cir-
cumstances present in Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the patient's
guardian was entitled to assert the patient's right to privacy. Id. at 38-42, 355 A.2d at
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stem function in addition to cessation of all other brain functions thus
avoids the possibility of a premature declaration of death. '
Since the medical profession apparently accepts the total brain
death requirement, physicians arguably will interpret the term "irrever-
sible cessation of brain function" to include destruction of brain stem
function.1 13 In view of current public concern with the "right to die" and
similar issues, however, statutorily requiring absence of brain stem func-
tion emphasizes the totality of the brain death concept and clearly
distinguishes between death and persistent vegetative state. ' One
rationale for a uniform standard such as the UDODA is to permit the use
of new diagnostic techniques to determine death while preserving the
degree of certainty essential to resolution of legal issues. ' Failure to
emphasize the totality of the brain death standard, however, injects am-
biguity into the distinction between life and death.' Accordingly, the
brain death standard contained in the UDODA provides a clearer distinc-
tion between life and death by specifically excluding physical states in
which any brain activity continues. '
Although the statutory language of the UDODA fails to state ex-
pressly that the enumerated standards apply for all legal and medical
661-64. Although physicians withdrew the respirator from Karen Ann in May, 1976, she
presently remains in a persistent vegetative state. See McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478.
"02 See, e.g., McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478 (requiring irreversible destruction of entire
brain makes clearest distinction currently possible between life and death); Victor, supra
note 9, at 45 (entire brain used as basis of brain death "to err on side of conservatism");
Commissioners' Note, supra note 85 (persistent vegetative state not valid legal or medical
basis for determining death); note 101 supra (patient with brain stem function exhibited
spontaneous respiration after discontinuance of artificial support).
1"3 See, e.g., Harvard Committee, supra note 8, at 340 (irreversible coma includes loss
of function at cerebral, brain stem, and often spinal level); Brain Death , supra note 1, at
1651 (brain death is condition in which the brain is destroyed completely); Victor, supra note
9, at 41, 44 (brain death is state of complete destruction of all brain tissue, including brain
stem).
10, See McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478 (importance of distinguishing between persis-
tent vegetative state and death); Commissioners' Note, supra note 85 (UDODA
distinguishes death from persistent vegetative state and does not address issues such as
death with dignity, living wills, or euthanasia).
15 See Gregory, supra note 5, at 1-2 (UDODA response to problems generated by in-
adequacy of traditional standard in view of current medical capabilities); McCabe, supra
note 85, at 1476, 1478 (adoption of UDODA represents recognition of evolution in medical
technology); text accompanying notes 93-97 supra (purpose of UDODA to establish legal
standard and permit advances in medical criteria).
'" See McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478 (failure to distinguish between death and persis-
tent vegetative state blurs distinction between life and death).
"0 UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; see McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478
(UDODA sharpens distinction between life and death by excluding persistent vegetative
state); Commissioners'Note, supra note 85 (rejecting concepts of neocortical death and per-
sistent vegetative state as valid bases for determining death). The only purpose of the
UDODA is to establish a standard for determining the occurrence of death and not to ad-
dress issues such as euthanasia or death with dignity. Commissioners'Note, supra note 85.
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purposes, the Act clearly applies to all situations.' 8 The UDODA pro-
vides simply that a patient who satisfies one of the statutory standards
is dead.'" The absence of any qualifying language in the provision,
together with the UDODA's stated purpose of unifying state law on the
subject of determining death,"0 indicates that the Act applies in all con-
texts. Thus, the UDODA avoids criticisms that confront states with
death standards limited to specific purposes."' By establishing general
standards appropriate for all legal and medical purposes, the UDODA
prevents the anomaly of considering a patient alive or dead depending
on the issue involved.
In contrast to several state determination of death statutes that re-
quire independent verification of death by two physicians,"' the UDODA
does not indicate the number of physicians required to make a deter-
mination of death."' The statutory requirement that more than one
physician independently determine the occurrence of death in each case
arguably prevents abuse by guarding against improper declarations of
death.' In addition, a confirmatory diagnosis of death may alleviate a
physician's fears of potential criminal or civil liability for terminating
artificial support devices."5 The UDODA's failure to require determina-
'08 See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; Commissioners' Note, supra note
85. Noting that the UDODA should apply to all situations, the NCCUSL stressed that state
legislatures should not incorporate the UDODA into the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
thereby liiiting the UDODA to organ donors. Commissioners' Note, supra note 85.
10' UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1.
11 UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 2.
", See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 106-07 (existence of multiple standard for dif-
ferent purposes risks confusion and abuse). See generally Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel,
supra note 52 (discussing Illinois statute that recognizes brain death only for purposes of
UAGA).
"I See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 & -3 (Supp. 1981) (independent confirmation by second
physician required when patient prospective organ donor or when brain death standard ap-
plied); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1981) (independent confirmation by
another physician); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139i(b) (West Supp. 1981) (two physicians
determine time of death); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.05 (Supp. 1981) (two physicians make deter-
mination of death); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1715.1 (1979) (independent confirmation of death by
another physician); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327-C-1 (Supp. 1979) (determination of death based
on brain death standard requires opinions of attending physician and consulting physician);
IOWA CODE § 702.8 (1979) (two physicians required to determine death based on brain death
standard); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1981) (two physicians required to pro-
nounce death of prospective organ donor); VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (Supp. 1981) (verification of
neurologist required when determination of death based on brain death standard).
Ill See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1.
11 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 62, at 918-19 (criticizing failure of Kansas determina-
tion of death statute to require examination by two physicians before pronouncing death);-
Selby & Selby, supra note 3, at 536 (noting that major criticism of Kansas statute lack of re-
quirement that two physicians pronounce death); cf. Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel, supra
note 52, at 713-16 (diagnosis of death by two physicians preferable but not essential).
" See Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel, supra note 52, at 714 (confirmatory opinion of
death ilay alleviate physicians' fears of liability for discontinuing artificial support).
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tion of death by a specific number of physicians is immaterial,
however." ' Determinations of death based on accepted standards of
medical practice permit the medical profession to decide whether
prevailing medical technology reasonably requires confirmatory deter-
minations of death."7 The requirement in the UDODA that physicians
perform according to ordinary medical practice imposes on the medical
profession an objective standard for determining death that arguably
deters abuse and eliminates the need for verification of death by another
physician."8
An additional potential criticism of the UDODA is the Act's failure
to address specifically the civil and criminal liability of physicians who
make determinations of death according to the provisions of the Act. A
number of state statutes expressly exempt from criminal or civil liability
a person who acts in good faith pursuant to the terms of the particular
determination of death statute."' Since determination of death statutes
authorize physicians to act according to the statutory standards, a provi-
sion exempting a person who complies with the statute from civil and
criminal liability appears unnecessary."' Thus, the absence of statutory
language addressing liability of persons who make determinations of
death does not diminish the effectiveness of the UDODA.
Of all determination of death standards that currently exist, the
UDODA is best designed to achieve the purposes of a determination of
death statute. The consensus of the ABA, AMA, and NCCUSL in draft-
ing the UDODA demonstrates the belief of the medical and legal profes-
sions that the UDODA provides effective standards for determining
death."' The effectiveness of the UDODA, however, is limited until all
... See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 116 (diagnosis by two physicians might be ap-
propriate in transplantation situation, but general determination of death standard should
not require safeguard of second diagnosis).
" See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1; Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at
116-17 (requisite number of physicians for determining brain death part of ordinary medical
standards); Commissioners'Note, supra note 85 (medical profession formulates appropriate
procedures for determination of death).
118 See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 116-17 (ordinary standards of medical practice
govern application of brain death procedures); Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel, supra note
52, at 713-14 (requirement of two physicians incorrectly suggests that determination of
brain death subjective or difficult or that some doctors not reliable to make accurate
diagnosis).
"' See ALA. CODE § 22-31-4 (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.085(4) (Supp. 1981); GA.
CODE ANN. § 88-1715.1(b) (1979); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t, § 2 (Vernon Supp.
1980); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-1(c) (Supp. 1980).
" See Legislation & Death, supra note 15, at 182 & n.40 (physician loses protection
from liability only if he or she acts outside bounds of statute or fails to exercise due care);
Commissioners' Note, supra note 85 (since no authorized person who acts in good faith in
reliance on UDODA is criminally or civilly liable for his or her acts, no need to address
liability in text of act).
121 See McCabe, supra note 85, at 1476 (UDODA represents agreement of medical and
legal profession on model determination of death act); Commissioners' Note, supra note 85




states legislatively enact the UDODA. Although four states have
adopted the UDODA since the NCCUSL approved the Act in August
1980,122 only two state legislatures have codified the UDODA. 1" In the
two states that judicially have adopted the UDODA, legislative adoption
of the Act is essential since the standards of the UDODA arguably apply
only in the context addressed in the particular cases.'24 Legislative adop-
tion of the UDODA by all states will establish legal and medical certainty
concerning determinations of death."' Furthermore, adoption of the
UDODA will ensure uniform treatment of persons in the same physical
condition."6 Consequently, all state legislatures should enact the
UDODA without delay.
PAMELA L. RYAN
12 See Swafford v. State, - Ind. 421 N.E.2d 596, 602 (1981); In re
Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 421, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (1980); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1981);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (Supp. 1981).
" See IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (Supp. 1981). In
Idaho, a previous statute provided that physicians apply a brain death standard, although
the statute did not preclude application of other customary or usual procedures. See IDAHO
CODE § 54-1819 (1979) (repealed 1981). Thus the Idaho legislature's adoption of the UDODA
and consequent repeal of the original brain death statute apparently indicates the
legislature's recognition that the UDODA provides a determination of death approach
preferable to a brain death model. Compare IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1979) (repealed 1981)
(nonpreclusive brain death standard) with IDAHO CODE § 15-1819 (Supp. 1981) (UDODA).
124 See Swafford v. State, __ Ind. . - 421 N.E. 2d 596, 602 (1981) (adopt-
ing UDODA for purposes of homicide cases); In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 421, 617 P.2d
731, 738 (1980) (adopting UDODA in authorizing withdrawal of life support devices from
child abuse victim medically determined brain death); text accompanying notes 50-56 supra
(problems with judicially adopted determination of death standards).
1I See McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478 (UDODA clarifies determination of death and
should achieve uniformity between states without delay); text accompanying notes 16-44
supra (issues that particularly require uniform statute for determining death).
" See McCabe, supra note 85, at 1478 (unconscionable for different jurisdictions to
treat matters of life and death differently).
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